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IMPLEMENTATION AND POLICY: PROBLEMS IN THE




The ostensible goal of United States trade law is to promote free-
market principles. The ideal espoused is maximum market efficiency,
achieved when free trade allows each country to specialize by exporting
those goods it can produce most efficiently and importing those goods
that it can produce only at a higher cost.' To the extent that foreign
countries and producers exporting goods to the United States under-
mine this ideal by failing to comply with the free-market standard im-
posed by United States law, their actions are deemed "unfair" trade
practices.2 Over the past one hundred years, the United States has de-
veloped a complex body of laws to protect domestic industries from
these unfair practices.' Foremost among these "unfair trade relief mea-
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I See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. LAWS AND REGULATIONS
APPLICABLE TO IMPORTS FROM NONMARKET ECONOMIES COULD BE IMPROVED 5
(1981) [hereinafter GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS]; Barcel6, Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Duties-Analysis and a Proposal, 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 779, 786-88
(1977); Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100
HARV. L. REV. 546, 549-51 (1987); Note, An Argument for Freer Trade: The
Nonmarket Economy Problem Under the U.S. Countervailing Duty Laws, 17 N.Y.U.J.
INT'L L. & POL. 407, 430 (1985). See generally P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 626-30
(11th ed. 1980) (explaining the theory of comparative advantage).
2 See Tarullo, supra note 1, at 552-53.
See J. PATTISON, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS §§ 1.01,
1.03-1.04 (International Business & Law Series No. 3, 1987) (discussing the develop-
ment of modern antidumping and countervailing duty laws). These unfair trade relief
measures are distinct from import relief measures, such as section 201 of the Trade Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. II, §§ 201-08, 88 Stat. 1978, 2011-18 (1975) (codi-
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sures" are antidumping4 and countervailing duty laws,5 which attempt
to equalize competitive conditions that have been distorted by dumped
or subsidized imports.6
The free-market principles underlying United States trade law
create difficulties in trade relations with nonmarket economy countries.7
Many of these difficulties center on whether those principles can be
translated and applied to trade with nonmarket economy countries.
To facilitate enforcement of the antidumping law against
nonmarket economy countries, Congress enacted legislation requiring
the Department of Commerce to circumvent the problem of the absence
of reliable price information by constructing that information hypothet-
ically through reference to data available in surrogate countries with
fled as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (providing for tempo-
rary restrictions on imports that, because of their increasing volume, are injuring do-
mestic industries and workers), or section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-618, tit. IV, § 406(c), 88 Stat. 1978, 2062-63 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2436(c) (1982)) (providing for relief from imports from communist countries when
those imports disrupt domestic markets and cause material injury to domestic industries
or unions). See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 7-8.
" See 19 U.S.C. § 1673-1673i (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Dumping is a form of
international price discrimination whereby a producer charges a lower price for its
product in a foreign market than it charges for the product in its domestic market. See
J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (1923 & reprint
1966). The United States antidumping laws are directed at offsetting the competitive
advantage that accrues to parties engaged in dumping products in the United States.
See J. PATTISON, supra note 3, § 1.02[1], at 1-3; see also infra notes 23-50 and ac-
companying text (describing the purpose, history, and operation of the antidumping
laws).
I See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671-1671f (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). A countervailing
duty is a special fee levied on imports that have benefited from government subsidies.
The purpose of United States countervailing duty laws is to offset the competitive ad-
vantage that accrues to the producers and exporters of subsidized imports. See 1 P.
FELLER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE GUIDE § 17.01 (1987); see also
infra notes 72-108 and accompanying text (describing purpose, history, and operation
of the countervailing duty laws).
I See J. PATTISON, supra note 3, § 1.01, at 1-2. Other unfair trade relief mea-
sures include investigations into unfair methods of competition in import trade, see 19
U.S.C. §§ 1337-38 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), and retaliation against countries that
impose unreasonable restrictions on the importation of United States goods and ser-
vices, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See GAO REPORT TO THE CON-
GRESS, supra note 1, at 6.
7 The term "nonmarket economy country" is used throughout this Comment to
refer to countries with nonmarket, state-controlled, or centrally-planned economies.
Many authors refer to these countries as NMEs, SCEs, or CPEs. The following coun-
tries are frequently singled out for special treatment as nonmarket economy countries
under the United States trade laws: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Demo-
cratic Republic, Hungary, People's Republic of China, Poland, Romania, and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note
1, at 1. Yugoslavia, because of the unique features of its economy, is not universally
recognized as a nonmarket economy country. See id.
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market economies." Some commentators believe constructed values and
surrogate countries can be used to determine the fair value of goods
produced in nonmarket economy countries.9 Others question the viabil-
ity of comparing dissimilar economies.' °
Congress did not enact specific legislation to facilitate implementa-
tion of the countervailing duty laws against nonmarket economy coun-
tries. This inaction left open whether, and how, the laws were to be
applied against nonmarket economy countries. In 1986, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit reached its own conclusion in
Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States," holding that a countervail-
able subsidy cannot be found in a nonmarket economy. 2 Consequently,
the court upheld a determination by the Department of Commerce that,
while nonmarket economy countries are not specifically exempt from
these laws, the impossibility of identifying ahd quantifying subsidies in
their economies renders the laws inapplicable. 3
This result is not universally approved. Some critics argue that the
surrogate-country procedures employed in antidumping investigations
can also be applied to countervailing duty investigations against
nonmarket economy countries.' 4 Others argue that surrogate-country
8 See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. III, § 321(d), 88 Stat. 1978,
2046-48 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1982)); 19 C.F.R. § 358.8 (1987)
(regulations implementing this approach); see infra notes 51-71 and accompanying text
(discussing the surrogate-country and constructed value methods).
" See, e.g., Comment, Dumping by State-Controlled-Economy Countries: The Po-
lish Golf Cart Case and the New Treasury Regulations, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 230-
43 (1979) (discussing the Treasury regulations on constructed value and surrogate-
country methods and concluding that these approaches are a significant improvement
over past enforcement efforts).
10 See, e.g., Alford, When Is China Paraguay? An Examination of the Applica-
tion of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China
and Other "Nonmarket Economy" Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 98-127 (1987)
(criticizing surrogate country procedures as an inadequate attempt to overcome the im-
possibility of comparing dissimilar economies); Soltysinski, Price Competition Between
Free-Market and State-Controlled Economy Enterprises: The Legacy of the OMC v.
Pezetel Litigations, 24 Swiss REV. INT'L COMPETITION L. 5, 20-23 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter Soltysinski, Price Competition] (discussing specific problems that arise in the direct
application of free-market economy concepts to nonmarket economy countries); S.
Soltysinski, The U.S. Import Relief Laws and Trade With Centrally Planned Econo-
mies 27-30 (forthcoming 3 FLA. INT'L L.J. (1988)) [hereinafter S. Soltysinski, U.S.
Import Relief Laws] (same) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
x 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
12 See id. at 1315. The court also concluded that Congress did not intend that the
countervailing duty laws be applied against these countries. See id. at 1316-18.
13 See id. at 1309.
14 See, e.g., Ehrenhaft, The Treasury's Proposed Approach to Imports from State-
Controlled Economy Countries and State-Owned Enterprises Under the Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Laws, in INTERFACE ONE: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS ON
THE APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS TO
IMPORTS FROM STATE-CONTROLLED ECONOMIES AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
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procedures are unfair and inadequate methods for determining whether
a nonmarket economy country is engaged in an unfair trading prac-
tice.15 Recently, some members of Congress found the former group of
commentators more persuasive. In 1987, legislation was introduced in
both the House and the Senate to overturn Georgetown Steel and apply
countervailing duty laws against nonmarket economy countries.1 6
Proposals to apply the countervailing duty laws against nonmarket
economy countries raise two important issues: 1) is it technically possi-
ble to implement the countervailing duty laws against nonmarket econ-
omy countries; and 2) is the application of countervailing duty laws to
these countries consistent with the goals of United States trade policy?
This Comment refers to these issues throughout as problems of imple-
mentation and policy. The implementation problem was the focus of
80-81 (D. Wallace, G. Spina, R. Rawson & B. McGill eds. 1980) [hereinafter INTER-
FACE ONE] (Deputy Assistant Secretary and Special Council, Dep't of Treasury, dis-
cussing proposed Treasury regulations to use surrogate-country method for estimating
subsidies in nonmarket economy countries); Note, The Applicability of the United
States Countervailing Duty Law to Imports from Nonmarket Economy Countries, 9
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 596, 628-33 (1986) (proposing use of surrogate-country methods
and calling for legislative reversal of Georgetown Steel); Comment, Georgetown Steel
Corp. v. United States: Applying the Countervailing Duty Law to Imports from
Nonmarket Economy Countries, 18 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 313, 329-36 & 338
(1986) (suggesting the valuation of subsidies under the surrogate-country and simu-
lated-constructed value approaches and calling for legislative reversal of Georgetown
Steel); cf Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548, 555 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985) (noting that the absence of a fair market value "did not deter the enforc-
ing agency from developing the 'fair' home market value by reference to surrogate
countries with market economies"), rev'd sub. nom. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United
States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
15 See, e.g., Alford, supra note 10, at 81-84 (criticizing the notion that nations are
economically interchangeable); Corr, The NME Import Regulation Dilemma: Two
Proposals for a New Regulatory Approach, 12 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 59, 66-
70 (1987) (criticizing surrogate-country and constructed value methodologies); Knoll,
United States Antidumping Law: The Case for Reconsideration, 22 TEx. INT'L L.J.
265, 279-80 (1987) (criticizing constructed value test); Soltysinski, Price Competition,
supra note 10, at 8-14 (discussing the unfairness of surrogate-country procedures as
illustrated by the Polish Golf Cart litigation); Note, supra note 1, at 427-30 (discussing
analytical and administrative objections to the use of surrogate-country approaches to
identifying and quantifying subsidies); Comment, Countervailing Duties and Alterna-
tive Trade Remedies for Imports from Nonmarket Economies, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 699,
721-22 (1987) (determinations under surrogate procedure "have led to unpredictable
results and could cause abuse"); Recent Development, Countervailing Duties and
Non-Market Economies: The Case of the People's Republic of China, 10 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COMPETITION 405, 418-20 (1983) (rejecting the application of counter-
vailing duty laws against nonmarket economy as an ethnocentric value judgment).
18 See, e.g., Trade and International Economic Policy Reform Act of 1987, H.R.
3, § 157, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Trade Bill] (applying the
countervailing duty laws to nonmarket economy countries to the extent that a subsidy
can be identified and quantified by the administering authority); H.R. 1687, 100th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1987) (applying the countervailing duty laws to nonmarket economy
countries); S. 770, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987) (same).
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the Georgetown Steel case, and has since been addressed in a plethora
of law review articles, notes, and comments." These writings explore
the practical difficulties inherent in applying laws based on free-market
principles to countries with economies that expressly reject those princi-
ples. Despite the amount of authoritative commentary on this problem,
no consensus has been reached.18 The policy problem, however, has not
been examined as thoroughly.19 The current literature leaves unex-
plored the issue of whether the application of countervailing duty laws
to nonmarket economy countries would advance the efficiency goals of
the unfair trade practice laws.
This Comment addresses both the implementation and policy
problems. It is not the intention of this Comment to add to the already
voluminous literature discussing the difficulty of identifying and quan-
tifying subsidies in nonmarket economy countries. Rather, it reviews
this literature briefly to argue that applying countervailing duty laws to
nonmarket economy countries is possible only at the cost of sacrificing
accuracy in implementation.2" Consequently, the magnitude of the im-
11 See, e.g., Alford, supra note 10, at 89-95 (discussing technical problems of im-
plementing the countervailing duty laws against nonmarket economy countries); Hor-
lick & Shuman, Nonmarket Economy Trade and U.S. AntidumpingI Countervailing
Duty Laws, 18 INT'L LAW. 807, 828-30 (1984) (same); Note, supra note 14, at 621-25
(evaluating the implementation problem); Comment, supra note 14, at 327-36 (discuss-
ing alternative methods of identifying and quantifying subsidies in nonmarket economy
countries); S. Soltysinski, U.S. Import Relief Laws, supra note 10, at 2-10 (discussing
technical problems of implementing the countervailing duty laws against nonmarket
economy countries).
8 See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 17, at 828-30 (noting divergent views on
the question of whether subsidies in nonmarket economies are quantifiable). Compare
Continental Steel, 614 F. Supp. at 554-55 (concluding that the Department of Com-
merce has sufficient expertise to overcome the problems of measuring subsidies in
nonmarket economy countries) and Note, supra note 14, at 601, 628-33 (arguing that
the countervailing duty law should apply to nonmarket economy countries and sug-
gesting approaches) and Comment, supra note 14, at 327-33 (presenting alternative
approaches to valuing subsidies under the countervailing duty law) with Barcel6, supra
note 1, at 850 (stating that market imperfections and nondistortive actions have no
meaning in a nonmarket economy) and Note, supra note 1, at 408-09 (stating that the
theoretical and practical difficulties inherent in measuring subsidies in nonmarket econ-
omies argue for resorting to alternative measures) and Recent Development, supra
note 15, at 418-20 (criticizing the imposition of market-based norms on nonmarket
economy countries).
'9 Only a few authors have addressed the policy aspect of applying countervailing
duty laws to nonmarket economy countries. See Alford, supra note 10, at 127-30 (rec-
ognizing a need to move beyond the basic market/nonmarket distinction that under-
girds our present antidumping law); Tarullo, supra note 1, at 555-56 (concluding that
the administration of countervailing duty laws may be "connected more closely to im-
plicit views of 'proper' governmental economic functions than to the efficiency aims
upon which a market paradigm is based"); Recent Development, supra note 15, at
418-20 (regarding application of countervailing duty laws to the People's Republic of
China.)
20 The application of countervailing duty laws to goods from nonmarket economy
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plementation problem is simply a matter of the level of inaccuracy
Congress is willing to tolerate in order to impose free-market principles
on nonmarket economy countries.2
The policy problem, on the other hand, is less subjective. This
Comment contends that the economic principles underlying the unfair
trade practice laws militate against the application of countervailing
duty laws to nonmarket economy countries. It proposes that because
subsidization and dumping are virtually indistinguishable in nonmarket
economies, it would be irrational for Congress to apply both laws to
nonmarket economy countries. Parallel application of these laws would
go beyond offsetting the unfair trade practices of nonmarket economy
countries, resulting in the exaggerated protection of United States pro-
ducers. Consequently, the application of countervailing duty laws to
nonmarket economy countries would violate the free-trade efficiency
goals of United States trade laws.22
To reach these conclusions, this Comment examines the applica-
tion of both the antidumping and the countervailing duty laws against
nonmarket economy countries. Part I briefly reviews the purpose, his-
tory, and operation of the antidumping law. Part II examines similar
aspects of the countervailing duty laws. Part III analyzes the imple-
mentation and policy problems involved in applying the countervailing
duty laws to nonmarket economy countries. The Comment concludes
that efforts to apply the countervailing duty laws to nonmarket econ-
omy countries are misguided and should be abandoned.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES ANTIDUMPING LAW
The purpose of the antidumping law is to offset the competitive
advantage enjoyed by foreign manufacturers over United States produc-
countries would produce inaccuracies analogous to those currently experienced under
the antidumping law. Through the use of surrogate-country procedures, the Depart-
ment of Commerce would find itself hypothesizing the existence and value of alleged
subsidies. See infra notes 58-71 and accompanying text (describing the inaccuracies
inherent in the use of surrogate-country and constructed value methods). The focal
point of the implementation debate, therefore, should not be whether the law can be
applied to nonmarket economy countries, but rather whether the decrease in accuracy
that would accompany application is acceptable. But see Horlick & Shuman, supra
note 17, at 829 (asserting that opposing views on the implementation problem focus on
the definition of the term "subsidy").
2 Congress has already demonstrated its willingness to accept some imperfection
in the application of unfair trade practice laws to nonmarket economy countries. Meth-
ods currently employed in the discovery and quantification of dumping are inherently
inaccurate: they find an offense and calculate its magnitude by analogy rather than
through the alleged offender's actual cost and price data. See infra notes 58-71 and
accompanying text.
22 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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ers as a result of unfair pricing schemes.2" Dumping is a form of inter-
national price discrimination whereby products are sold at different
prices in different markets.24 In a "prototype dumping case," a pro-
ducer sells its goods abroad at a price lower than the prevailing home
market price.25 The difference between the product's price in the export
market and its fair value26 is called the "margin of dumping."2 Under
the United States antidumping law, a duty equal to the margin of
dumping is imposed on imports sold at a price less than their fair
value.2" By exactly offsetting the margin of dumping, the law elimi-
nates the producer's advantage, thus enforcing the goal of free-market
efficiency.
A. The History of Antidumping Law
Congress enacted the first antidumping law in 1916, providing a
civil cause of action for treble damages and criminal proceedings
against parties dumping foreign merchandise in the United States.29
The statute requires the plaintiff to demonstrate the defendant's intent
to destroy, injure, or prevent the establishment of an industry in the
United States, or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the
product in question. 30 Because of the difficulties in demonstrating in-
tent, few actions were filed under this law.3
Five years later, Congress enacted the Antidumping Act of 1921,32
a more potent law establishing a framework under which the Secretary
of the Treasury would initiate and investigate allegations of dumping
by foreign producers.33 The Antidumping Act of 1921 was broader in
2" See J. PATTISON, supra note 3, § 1.02[1], at 1-3. For a discussion of the ad-
vantage that accrues to firms engaged in dumping, see Fisher, The Antidumping Law
of the United States: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 5 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 85,
87-89 (1973).
2, See Fisher, supra note 23, at 86-87; see also supra note 4 (defining dumping).
15 See J. PATTISON, supra note 3, § 1.02[1] at 1-3 to 1-4; Fisher, supra note 23,
at 87.
26 The "fair value" of a product is generally considered to be the price of the
commodity in the country where it is produced. See J. PATTISON, supra note 3,
§ 1.02[1], at 1-4 n.2. Thus, "dumping" occurs when the product is sold in a foreign
market at a price that is less than the product's fair value. See id.
2 See J. BARTON & B. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 288-
90 (1986); J. PATTISON, supra note 3, § 1.02[1], at 1-4 n.2.
28 See J. PATTISON, supra note 3, § 1.02[1], at 1-4 n.2.
29 See Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 801, 39 Stat. 756, 798 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 72 (1982)).
30 See id.
21 See J. PATrISON, supra note 3, § 1.03[1], at 1-7 to 1-8.
3' Act of May 27, 1921, ch. 14, 42 Stat. 11, repealed and superceded by Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144.
33 See Comment, Technical Analysis of the Antidumping Agreement and the
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scope than its predecessor; its coverage was not restricted to predatory
dumping and therefore it was much easier to trigger.34 The Act re-
mained substantially unamended until enactment of the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979.
35
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 modified the antidumping
laws to bring them into conformity with the antidumping agreements
reached at the Tokyo Round Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 36 In the
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,37 Congress enacted procedural amend-
ments to the antidumping law, to alleviate the Department of Com-
merce's38 heavy workload in this area.39
Trade Agreements Act, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1405, 1409 (1979).
-1 See id.
3' Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979). Minor changes were made by the
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 321(d), 88 Stat. 1978, 2046-48 (1975), in
which Congress amended the law to facilitate application to nonmarket economy coun-
tries. See infra notes 57-71 and accompanying text (discussing surrogate country and
constructed value methods); see also Comment, supra note 9, at 224-27 (discussing
section 205(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, which enacts the Treasury's third-country
price test).
Antidumping laws were also addressed in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered
into force Jan. 1, 1948) [hereinafter GATT]. The GATT was the first significant post-
World War II multilateral trade agreement. It sets nonbinding standards and rules of
nondiscrimination in trade between signatory nations. The United States law was ex-
cused from consistency from the GATT because of the "grandfather clause" in the
Protocol of Provisional Application. See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW
OF GATT § 30.1, at 770-71 (1969).
36 See Agreement of Interpretation and Application of Article VI of the GATT,
April 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919, T.I.A.S. No. 9650, GATT BISD 26th Supp. 171
(1980) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1980) [hereinafter Antidumping Code].
The Tokyo Round Multilateral Trade Negotiations was one of a series of mul-
tination discussions on issues in international trade. Generally, the countries participat-
ing in these discussions are signatories to the GATT. However, a significant number of
non-GATT countries participated in the Tokyo Round.
The previous round of negotiations, the Kennedy Round, was directed at lowering
import tariffs. See L. GLICK, MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: WORLD TRADE
AFTER THE TOKYO ROUND 5-7 (1984). The Tokyo Round negotiations, however,
were directed at the reduction of nontariff barriers. See id. at 9-11. Many nonmarket
economy countries participated in the Tokyo Round, including GATT signatories
(Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Cuba, and Yugoslavia) and non-GATT countries
(Bulgaria and Vietnam). See id. at 3.
37 Pub. L. No. 98-573, tit. VI, 98 Stat. 2948, 3024-43 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 19 U.S.C.).
3 Responsibility for implementing the antidumping law was initially vested in the
Treasury Department. That responsibility was transferred to the Secretary of Com-
merce in 1980 under President Carter's Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, see 44
Fed. Reg. 69,273, 69,274 (1979), implemented by Exec. Order No. 12,175, 3 C.F.R. §
463 (1980).
3' See S. LANDE & C. VANGRASSTEK, THE TRADE AND TARIFF AcT OF 1984:
TRADE POLICY IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 107 (1986).
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B. Elements of Antidumping Investigations
There are two basic elements of an antidumping investigation: a
determination by the United States International Trade Commission
(ITC) that an import causes or threatens to cause material injury to a
domestic industry and a determination by the International Trade Ad-
ministration (ITA) of the Department of Commerce that "a class or
kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the
United States at less than its fair value ... ."" If material injury is
not shown, then no antidumping duty may be imposed, regardless of
whether the ITA determines that goods are being sold at less than fair
value.41 If both investigations result in affirmative determinations, the
ITA imposes a duty on the product in an amount equal to the margin
of dumping.42
To determine whether a product is being dumped, the ITA com-
pares the product's fair value-also referred to as "foreign market
value" 43-with the product's United States sales price.4 Congress has
specified a number of alternative methods for calculating a product's
fair value.45 The most preferred of these methods uses the price of the
product in its home market.46 If the ITA is unable to identify a reliable
price through home market sales, it will then look to the price at which
the product is sold in third countries other than the United States.4"
The ITA is sometimes unable to determine a product's fair value
even after considering the product's home market price and its price in
third country markets. In these cases, the ITA turns to the "constructed
value" of the product.48 A product's constructed value is the cost of
materials, fabrication, general expenses, and profit.49 After determining
a product's fair value either through the home market, foreign market,
or constructed value methods, the ITA compares that value with the
40 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982). These determinations take place simultaneously. See
E. ROSSIDES, U.S. IMPORT TRADE REGULATION 197 (1986).
41 See 1 P. FELLER, supra note 5, § 18.06[1].
42 See J. PATrISON, supra note 3, § 1.03[2], at 1-10.
'3 See 19 C.F.R. § 353.1 (1987).
44 See E. ROSSIDES, supra note 40, at 198.
41 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); HousE COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF U.S.
TRADE STATUTES 41-42 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF U.S. TRADE
STATUTES].
46 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
47 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B) (1982).
48 See id. § 1677b(a)(2).
'9 See 19 C.F.R. § 353.8(a)(2); I P. FELLER, supra note 5, § 18.03[3]; see also
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (setting out factors to be considered in
calculating a product's constructed value).
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product's United States price.50 The difference between the two is the
margin of dumping and the amount of the antidumping duty.
C. The Application of Antidumping Laws to Nonmarket Economy
Countries
When enacting the current United States antidumping law, Con-
gress realized that difficulties would occur when calculating the fair
value of products produced in nonmarket economy countries.5 1 Accord-
ingly, both antidumping law and the Commerce Department's imple-
menting regulations establish special methods for calculating the fair
value of imports from nonmarket economy countries.52 Under these
methods, the ITA simulates what the nonmarket economy producer's
production costs and prices would be if the producer were operating in
a comparable "surrogate" free-market economy country.5"
These methods, in the order of preference established by the De-
partment of Commerce, are 1) the home market price of a similar prod-
uct produced in the surrogate country;54 2) the export price of the sur-
rogate country's similar product;55 3) the constructed value of a
surrogate producer's product; 56 and 4) the value of the nonmarket econ-
omy producer's product simulated through a calculation of the market
value of the nonmarket economy producer's production function.57
These methods, however, have not eliminated the problem of valuing
these imports from nonmarket economy countries.58
51 See OVERVIEW OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES, supra note 45, at 41.
11 See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 174, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7186, 7311.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1982); 19 C.F.R. § 353.8 (1987).
5 See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 12-13. A surrogate
country is one with a market economy that is "at a stage of economic development
comparable to the state-controlled-economy . . . from which the merchandise is ex-
ported." 19 C.F.R. § 353.8(b)(1) (1987). If no such country exists, another non-state-
controlled-economy country will be used as a surrogate, with prices adjusted for known
differences in material and labor costs. See id. § 353.8(b)(2).
See 19 C.F.R. § 353.8(a)(1) (1987). The surrogate-country's home market
price is the price at which the similar merchandise is sold or offered for sale in the
country. See id.
5' See id. The export price is the price at which the similar merchandise is sold or
offered for sale by the surrogate country to third countries other than the United States
at the time of exportation. See id. § 353.5(a).
56 See id. § 353.8(a)(2). The constructed value of a product is the sum of the cost
of materials, cost of production, an estimate of general expenses, and the usual industry
profit. See id. § 353.6(a).
" See id. § 353.8(c). Production costs used in the calculation include hours of
labor required, raw materials expended, and amounts of energy consumed. A reasona-
ble amount for general expenses and profit is added to the market value of the produc-
tion function to obtain the final constructed value of the merchandise. See id.
58 Cf GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 16-26 (outlining sug-
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The main problems faced when applying the special methods for
calculating dumping margins by nonmarket economy producers revolve
around the accuracy of surrogate-country comparisons. The outcome of
an antidumping proceeding involving the use of a surrogate country
depends heavily upon the choice of the surrogate.5" The current regula-
tions, however, offer the ITA minimal guidance in choosing a surrogate
country with a market economy at a comparable stage of
development."0
Even if a proper surrogate country is found, the subsequent price
comparison cannot determine conclusively whether the nonmarket econ-
omy producer is engaged in dumping. The most that these approaches
can possibly reveal is a price differential between the product's United
States sales price and the price of a similar product in the surrogate
country. The differential, or lack thereof, can be caused by a variety of
factors unrelated to dumping. The nonmarket economy producer may
enjoy a "real" competitive advantage resulting from an economy of
scale;6" the choice of surrogate country may have been misguided;62 or
the surrogate country may be subsidizing its producers.1
3
Under the surrogate-country approaches, the ITA also encounters
problems in gathering information from both the nonmarket economy
producer and the surrogate-country government and producers. 4 The
surrogate-country producer may refuse to provide information out of
fear that it will subject itself to a future antidumping investigation. 5
The nonmarket economy country also will often refuse to provide infor-
mation necessary to the investigation.66
The surrogate constructed value approach only requires confiden-
gested improvements in the use and administration of these special nonmarket economy
country methods).
'9 See Note, supra note 1, at 427-30.
60 See 19 C.F.R. § 353.8(b) (1987) ("Comparability of economic development
shall be determined from genera.lly recognized criteria, including per capita gross na-
tional product and infrastructure development (particularly in the industry producing
such or similar merchandise).") The problems created under this vague standard of
comparability are discussed in Horlick & Shuman, supra note 17, at 820-21.
"1 Cf Note, supra note 1, at 429 (noting that the surrogate-producer method
"does not allow the nonmarket producer to demonstrate that its processes utilize some
economic efficiency that results in its lower export prices").
62 See Comment, supra note 14, at 330-31; Note, supra note 1, at 427-28.
8 See Note, supra note 1, at 428.
See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 17, at 821-22.
65 See S. Soltysinski, U.S. Import Relief Laws, supra note 10, at 9. The surro-
gate-country government may also withhold information out of fear that it will expose
itself to a future countervailing duty investigation. See id.
66 See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 2 ("[I]n many of these
countries, divulging government or enterprise operating data is a violation of domestic
law.").
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tial information from the nonmarket economy producer.67 This ap-
proach, however, requires the ITA to account for known price differen-
tials between the surrogate and nonmarket economy countries. Such an
accounting would require a cost comparison of materials and labor be-
tween the two countries 6 -which in turn requires reliance upon prices
that are economically meaningless in the nonmarket economy country.69
Even if these prices could be determined, the imprecision of nonmarket
economy exchange rates prevents the conversion of prices to a meaning-
ful dollar value. 0
Despite the problems with the surrogate-country approaches to
quantifying dumping margins in nonmarket economy countries, there is
no legislative movement to discontinue application of the antidumping
law to nonmarket economy countries. This law represents Congress's
belief that it is necessary to offset dumping by nonmarket economy pro-
ducers, even if the best method for doing so is laden with inaccuracies.
7'
II. AN OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES COUNTERVAILING DUTY
LAWS
The purpose of United States countervailing duty laws is to offset
the unfair competitive advantage that foreign manufacturers enjoy over
domestic producers as a result of subsidies granted by foreign govern-
ments to their industries.72 The principle behind these laws is that
United States producers should not have to compete with foreign firms
that are not subject to the same competitive market constraints.7 3 An
important distinction between antidumping and countervailing duty
laws is that the former aim to offset unfair trade practices initiated by
private foreign enterprises, while the latter aim to offset unfair trade
practices initiated by foreign governments. 4 Under United States coun-
17 See Note, supra note 14, at 631.
88 See id.
"' See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 17, at 818.
70 See Zerby, Ellsworth & Schmitt, Dumping of Non-Factor Services: Some Im-
plications of Recent Experiences with Controlled-Economy Shipping, 4 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 37, 45 (1982) (noting that the exchange rate is also state-controlled "so that
it may not be an appropriate numeraire for converting these costs into [dollars]").
"1 See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 12-25 (recommending
amendment, not abolition, of the surrogate-country methods, despite recognition that
the methods produce results that are "highly unpredictable and of limited economic
validity").
,1 See OVERVIEW OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES, supra note 45, at 40.
73 See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 6.
7" See J. BARTON & B. FISHER, supra note 27, at 281 ("[It is usually afirm that
dumps but a government that subsidizes. . . ."); see also Denton, The Non-Market
Economy Rules of the European Community's Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Du-
ties Legislation, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 198, 236 (1987) ("In a free-market situation
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tervailing duty law, the duty is equal to the countervailable subsidy,"'
thereby enforcing the goal of free-market efficiency.
A. The History of Countervailing Duty Law
Congress enacted this nation's first countervailing duty law in
1890.76 This law required the imposition of an additional duty on
sugar imported from countries paying "directly or indirectly, a bounty
on the exportation" of certain grades of sugar.7 Seven years later, in
the Tariff Act of 1897, Congress passed a more general countervailing
duty law.7 The 1897 Act substantially broadened the scope of
countervailable imports by covering any dutiable merchandise that re-
ceived a bounty or grant paid directly or indirectly on exportation.7 1 In
order to provide relief from such imports, the Act required that a coun-
tervailing duty, equal to the net amount of the subsidy, be imposed on
the import.8"
The Tariff Acts of 19131 and 192282 further expanded counter-
vailing duty law.83 Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 offered a small
change in administrative procedure but was otherwise identical in sub-
stance and language to the 1922 law. 4 In the Trade Act of 1974, Con-
gress amended section 303, expanding the scope of the law to cover any
... dumping is in the private domain and subsidies are in the public domain."). But
see Fisher, Dumping: Confronting the Paradox of Internal Weakness and External
Challenge, 1 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 11, 12 (197-9) (asserting that dumping
practices are increasingly state-led policy efforts).
71 See J. PAT'rTISON, supra note 3, § 1.04, at 1-13.
78 See Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, § 237, 26 Stat. 567, 584 (McKinley Tariff).
" See id. Grants paid on a product's exportation are called "export subsidies."
See J. JACKSON, supra note 35, § 15.1, at 355-56. Congress reenacted this provision in
1894, applying it to all sugar imports, and introduced the concept of the net subsidy.
See Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 182.5, 28 Stat. 509, 521.
78 See Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205 (Dingley Tariff).
7 See id. The Act also expanded the coverage of the 1894 Act to include subsidies
provided by any country, dependency, or colony. See id.
80 See id.
"' Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (Underwood Tariff Act).
82 Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858 (Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act).
83 The Tariff Act of 1913 expanded countervailing duty law to include imports
receiving a bounty or grant from a "province, or other political subdivision of govern-
ment." Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § IV(E), 38 Stat. 114, 193. The Tariff Act of 1922
further broadened the scope of countervailable subsidies. It applied to bounties or
grants bestowed by a "person, partnership, association, cartel, or corporation" and cov-
ered products benefiting from domestic subsidies by including bounties "upon the man-
ufacture or production" of articles. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 303, 42 Stat. 858,
935-36.
84 See Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 303, 46 Stat. 590, 687 (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982)) (Smoot-Hawley Tariff) (varying from Tariff Act of 1922
only by requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to measure and declare each distinct
subsidy applied to an imported item and not simply their sum).
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subsidized article or merchandise, regardless of whether it is a dutiable
good."6 In addition, the Act required a determination of injury to a
United States industry before imposing a countervailing duty on duty-
free imports, but only if such a test is required by international
obligations."6
In 1979, Congress enacted a second countervailing duty law by
adding section 701 to the Tariff Act of 1930.17 The central purpose of
this amendment was to make the trade laws consistent with the re-
quirements of the Subsidies Code, signed that year at the Tokyo Round
Multilateral Trade Negotiations."" The reforms promulgated by the
Subsidies Code regarding countervailing duty laws are quite basic. The
Subsidies Code, like the GATT, requires that countervailing duties not
be imposed on an import until a material injury to an industry in the
importing country is shown." The Subsidies Code, however, further
defines this standard of material injury, setting out explicit guidelines
for determining when a material injury has been inflicted or is
threatened.
Congress implemented these commitments in section 701 rather
than amending the existing language in section 303 because the re-
quirements of the Subsidies Code are meant to apply only to countries
that are signatories to the Subsidies Code or countries with whom the
United States has negotiated substantially similar bilateral agree-
8' See Trade Act of 11974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 303(a)(1), 88 Stat. 1978, 2049
(1975) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982)).
88 See id. § 303(b), 88 Stat. at 2049. This provision undoubtedly refers to obliga-
tions arising under the GATT. Under the terms of the GATT, countervailing duties
may be applied only in instances where the importing country determines that a subsi-
dized import is causing or threatens to cause material injury to a domestic industry. See
GATT, supra note 35, art. VI, 5. The United States was not required to amend its
laws to comply with the GATT because of a "grandfather clause" in the Protocol of
Provisional Application that exempts previously existing legislation from compliance
with GATT requirements. See supra note 35.
" See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§ 101, 103, 93 Stat.
144, 151, 190 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1982)).
88 See supra note 36. The agreement concerning subsidies and countervailing du-
ties negotiated at the Tokyo Round is the Agreement on Interpretation and Application
of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April
12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, GATT BISD, 26th Supp. 56 (1980)
(entered into force Jan. 1 1980) [hereinafter Subsidies Code]. For a more comprehen-
sive overview of the Tokyo Round and the resulting agreements, see generally L.
GLICK, supra note 36, and IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYo ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTI-
TUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES (J. Jackson, J. Louis, & M. Mat-
sushita eds. 1984).
88 See Subsidies Code, supra note 88, art. 1, 31 U.S.T. at 519, T.I.A.S. No. 9619,
at 2, GATT BISD, 26th Supp. at 57.(requiring continued signatory compliance with
article VI of the GATT).
0 See id. art. 6, 31 U.S.T. at 527-29, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, at 10-12, GATT BISD,
26th Supp. at 57.
[Vol. 136:1647
COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS
ments.91 Consequently, the United States has two different counter-
vailing duty laws-one that applies to countries that have signed the
Subsidies Code or a similar agreement, and a second law that applies to
all other countries. The only substantive difference between the two is
that the former, section 701, requires the administering authority to
make a determination of material injury before imposing countervailing
duties, whereas the latter, section 303, requires no showing of injury."
Currently, most nonmarket economy countries are not signatories to the
Subsidies Code and therefore do not receive the benefit of an injury
test.93
Congress has not substantially altered the countervailing duty laws
since 1979. Amendments embodied in the Trade and Tariff Act of
1984"' broadened the scope of the laws to cover upstream subsidies,9"
but were otherwise limited to altering filing and processing require-
ments for petitions and investigations.
B. Elements of Countervailing Duty Investigations
There are three basic elements of a countervailing duty investiga-
tion: finding material injury to a domestic industry (when applicable),"8
identifying the existence of a subsidy, and quantifying the net benefit
conveyed by the subsidy.97
The ITC is responsible for investigating the first element, whether
an industry has been materially injured, and whether the allegedly sub-
sidized import is a cause of the injury. 8 The ITC analyzes the volume
91 See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, tit. I, § 101, 93 Stat.
151 ("[Tjhe term 'country under the Agreement' means a country . . . which has as-
sumed obligations ... under the Agreement .... "). For a further discussion of coun-
tries considered to be "countries under the agreement," see J. PATTISON, supra note 3,
§ 6.01[2].
92 Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2) (1982) (no injury test required under § 303)
with 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (a)(2) (1982) (injury test available under § 701).
" See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 29; see also infra note
163 (detailing major nonmarket economy countries' eligibility for injury test).
"' Pub. L. No. 98-573, tit. VI, 98 Stat. 2948, 3024-43 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 19 U.S.C.)
" An "upstream subsidy" is a benefit bestowed on an input used in the produc-
tion of a good to be exported. See OVERVIEW OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES, supra note
45, at 50.
98 See 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2) (1982); 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) (1982); OVERVIEW
OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES, supra note 45, at 52. This element is required only in
investigations initiated under section 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1671
(1982). See supra text accompanying notes 89-93.
17 See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 28.
9' See OVERVIEW OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES, supra note 45, at 52. See gener-
ally, Madden, The Threat of Material Injury Standard in Countervailing Duty En-
forcements, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 373 (1984) (arguing that while the material
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of imports, their effect on United States prices, and their effect on
United States producers, taking into account such factors as "lost sales,
market share, profits, productivity, return on investment, and utiliza-
tion of production capacity.""9 If the ITC determines that the imports
in question are causing material injury to a domestic industry, the in-
vestigation is then turned over to the ITA.'
0 °
The ITA is responsible for the second and third elements of a
countervailing duty investigation. Its dual task of identifying and quan-
tifying alleged subsidies is frequently difficult.'' Part of this difficulty
stems from the amorphous nature of the term "subsidy." Neither the
GATT, the Subsidies Code, nor the United States countervailing duty
laws define the term. The countervailing duty laws merely provide that
the term means the same as the terms "bounty" and "grant" as used in
section 303.102
Conventional definitions refer to a subsidy as a "grant of money
from a government to a private enterprise." '"13 Some scholars, however,
argue that subsidies are manifested in almost any government policy
that benefits an industry."' ° While the laws ostensibly cover subsidies
granted by institutions other than governments,' 0 5 countervailing duties
injury prong of the analysis is the most opaque, the ITC, through its decisions, has
given it constant and predictable meaning).
" OVERVIEW OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES, supra note 45, at 52.
100 See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In 1980, enforcement
responsibilities for the countervailing duty and antidumping laws were transferred from
the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Commerce pursuant to President
Carter's Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979. See 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273, 69,274 (1979),
implemented by Exec. Order No. 12,175, 3 C.F.R. § 463 (1980).
101 See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 31.
102 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982); OVERVIEW OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES,
supra note 45, at 51. These laws also provide an illustrative list of subsidies that in-
clude the examples of export subsidies set out in the Subsidies Code. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(5)(A) (1982) (defining the term "subsidy" to include "[any export subsidy
described in Annex A to the [Subsidies Code]").
10. WEBSTER'S DELUXE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1816 (2d ed. 1979); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1280 (5th ed. 1979) ("[a] grant of money made by govern-
ment"); THE MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 446 (3d ed.
1983) ("[a] payment to individuals or business by a government for which it receives no
products or services in return").
104 See J. JACKSON, supra note 35, at 366 ("Indeed, almost anything that assists a
business could be termed a subsidy. . . ."); Mundheim & Ehrenhaft, What Is a "Sub-
sidy"? A Discussion Paper, in INTERFACE THREE: LEGAL TREATMENT OF DOMESTIC
SUBSIDIES 95 (D. Wallace, F. Loftus & V. Krikoriam eds. 1984) [hereinafter INTER-
FACE THREE] (discussing the status of government job training programs, relaxed envi-
ronmental restrictions, depreciation rules, government purchases, and industry-specific
research and development grants as domestic subsidies).
105 See 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1) (1982) (The Act applies "whenever any country,
dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government, person,
partnership, association, cartel, or corporation, shall pay or bestow . . . any bounty or
grant . . ").
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have never been imposed to offset subsidies granted by nongovernmen-
tal institutions. 106
After identifying a government action as a subsidy, the ITA must
quantify the net benefit the producer receives from that action. First,
the ITA must calculate the gross value of the subsidy. From that value,
the ITA subtracts any costs incurred in receiving the subsidy.10 7 The
resulting figure is the net amount of the subsidy, and will be the
amount of the countervailing duty imposed. 0 8 Under this formula, the
countervailing duty should exactly offset the unfair competitive advan-
tage enjoyed by the subsidized exporter.
C. The Application of Countervailing Duty Laws to Nonmarket
Economy Countries
Before the 1980s, no countervailing duty investigation was initi-
ated against a product from a nonmarket economy country. 09 In late
September 1983, a group of United States textile manufacturers and
unions 10 filed a petition for the first such investigation, against imports
from the People's Republic of China.' The petition alleged that
China's policy of granting a preferred monetary exchange and other
benefits to the producers of exported goods-in this case, textiles, ap-
parel, and related products-constituted a countervailable subsidy.1 2
The investigation was never completed; in response to protests from the
106 The scope of the countervailing duty laws were administratively limited to
subsidies provided by governments in Grain Oriented Silicon Electrical Steel from It-
aly, 42 Fed. Reg. 54,899 (Dep't Treas. 1977) (final determination), in which the De-
partment of the Treasury based its negative finding on the inability of the petitioners to
prove that the government provided the alleged subsidy. See also Verrill, State-Owned
Enterprises and the Countervailing Duty Law: Where, Oh, Where, to Draw the Line,
in INTERFACE THREE, supra note 104, at 36 ("The law, as most recently amended,
limits the definition of countervailable subsidies to those paid by the government or
required by government actions.").
107 These costs might include application fees or deposits paid in order to receive
the subsidy, any loss in the value of the subsidy resulting from government-mandated
deferred receipt, and any duties or charges specifically intended to offset the subsidy.
See OVERVIEW OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES, supra note 45, at 51; J. PAT'rsoN, supra
note 3, § 6.01[6].
108 See 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (requiring that the coun-
tervailing duty imposed be "equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant").
109 See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 27; Recent Develop-
ment, supra note 15, at 405 n.5.
110 The petition was filed by the American Textiles Manufacturers Institute
(ATMI), the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU), and the
International Ladies' Garment Workers Union (ILGWU). See Textiles, Apparel, and
Related Products from the People's Republic of China, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,600 (Dep't
Comm. 1983) (initiation) [hereinafter Textiles from China].
"I See Recent Development, supra note 15, at 405.
... See Textiles from China, supra note 110, at 46,600.
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Chinese government, the Secretary of Commerce convinced the petition-
ers to withdraw their petition in return for a guarantee that the execu-
tive branch would work to resolve their concerns through other
channels.1
A second countervailing duty petition was filed against a
nonmarket economy country in November 1983, alleging that Poland
and Czechoslovakia were subsidizing exports of carbon steel wire
rod. " "' In its investigation, the Department of Commerce determined
that countervailable subsidies cannot be identified in a nonmarket econ-
omy country." 5 The Department concluded that the concept of subsidi-
zation has no meaning in an economy where costs, prices, and profits
are determined by central planning rather than by market forces.""
The carbon steel wire rod determinations subsequently led the Depart-
ment to rescind a separate countervailing duty investigation into im-
ports of potash (potassium chloride) from the German Democratic Re-
public" 7 and the Soviet Union." 8
The Department's nonmarket economy "exemption" is based on
its view that the basic elements of a countervailing duty investiga-
tion-identification and quantification of the alleged subsidy" 9-are
thwarted by the structure of a nonmarket economy. 20 This "exemp-
tion" was overruled by the Court of International Trade"2' in Conti-
"13 See Textile, Apparel, and Related Products from The People's Republic of
China, 48 Fed. Reg. 55,492 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (termination); Industry, Commerce
Agree to Delay Decision of Chinese Textiles CVD Case, 9 U.S. Import Weekly (BNA)
No. 10, at 373 (Dec. 7, 1983); Recent Development, supra note 15, at 407 n.14a. The
Administration altered procedures under section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19
U.S.C. § 2436 (1982), allowing the President to invoke import relief against market
disruption caused by imports from communist countries. See Recent Development,
supra note 15, at 407 n.14b.
114 See Carbon Steel Wire Rod From Czechoslovakia, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,370 (Dep't
Comm. 1984) (final determination) [hereinafter Steel from Czechoslovakia]; Carbon
Steel Wire Rod From Poland, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,374 (Dep't Comm. 1984) (final deter-
mination). Because these determinations are virtually identical, future citations are only
to the Steel from Czechoslovakia determination.
115 See Steel from Czechoslovakia, supra note 114, at 19,371 ([Wle have con-
cluded that bounties or grants . . . cannot be found in NME's").
"a See Id. at 19,373.
11 See Potassium Chloride from the German Democratic Republic, 49 Fed. Reg.
23,428 (Dep't Comm. 1984) (rescission and dismissal).
11I See Potassium Chloride from the Soviet Union, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428 (Dep't
Comm. 1984) (rescission and dismissal).
119 See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 28. In some counter-
vailing duty cases, a showing of material injury to the affected industry is required.
Few nonmarket economy countries receive the benefit of this test, however. See infra
note 163.
120 See Steel from Czechoslovakia, supra note 114, at 19,373.
'21 The Court of International Trade has jurisdiction over final determinations
issued by the Department of Commerce in antidumping and countervailing duty pro-
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nental Steel Corp. v. United States. 2' In that case, the court concluded
that subsidies can exist in nonmarket economies, and that the Com-
merce Department should somehow discover a method for identifying
and quantifying them. 2 '
The Court of International Trade sought to circumvent the
problems of investigating alleged subsidies in nonmarket economy coun-
tries by broadly defining the concept of subsidization as "a distortion of
a pattern of regularity or even a pattern of reasonably expected fair-
ness." 24 Under this definition, the court reasoned that the ITA can
"detect patterns of regularity," 2 5 and identify as subsidies any "benefi-
cial deviations from those patterns." 2 '
In Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 27 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit reversed the holding of the Court of Inter-
national Trade. The Court of Appeals adopted the arguments set out
by the Commerce Department in its final determination 28 and con-
cluded that subsidization is a market phenomenon that by definition
cannot exist in a nonmarket economy.
1 29
III. THE IMPLEMENTATION AND POLICY PROBLEMS OF
APPLYING COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS TO NONMARKET
ECONOMY COUNTRIES
In 1987, several bills were introduced in the House and Senate to
invalidate Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States'"0 and apply the
countervailing duty laws against nonmarket economy countries. The
most successful of these efforts was section 157 of the 1987 Trade Bill.
This provision-introduced in the House and unopposed by the Sen-
ate-remained in the Bill until the final stages of the conference com-
mittee,13 1  suggesting that future legislative attempts to overturn
ceedings. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). This jurisdiction is ex-
clusive. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1982).
122 614 F. Supp. 548 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), rev'd sub. nom. Georgetown Steel
Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
123 See id. at 554 ("[T]he Commerce Department has the authority and ability to
detect patterns of regularity and investigate beneficial deviations from those pat-
terns-and it must do so regardless of the form of the economy.").
124 Id.
125 Id.
12 Id.; see also Horlick & Shuman, supra note 17, at 829-30 (explaining the
concept of defining subsidization as any government-sponsored preferential treatment).
121 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
128 See Note, supra note 14, at 621.
129 See Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1315-16.
120 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
131 The Senate, abandoning its own trade proposals, passed a bill laying out pro-
posed amendments to H.R. 3. The Senate version did not address the issue of applying
19881
1666 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Georgetown Steel may prove successful.
In considering section 157, however, Congress seemingly ignored
the policy implications and focused solely on implementation."3 2 The
Bill would have required the Department of Commerce to apply the
law to nonmarket economy countries whenever a subsidy could reason-
ably be identified and measured.133 The House Report addressed only
"the theoretical and administrative difficulties of applying the counter-
vailing duty law"134 and made no mention of whether application of
the law would be consistent with United States trade policy. Only the
Reagan administration objected to section 157 on policy grounds.13 '
This Part examines the implementation and policy problems that
arise with the application of countervailing duty laws to nonmarket
economy countries. The contention is that the implementation problem
fails to offer a dispositive argument either in favor of or in opposition to
the application of countervailing duty laws to these countries. The im-
plementation problem can be circumvented by the use of surrogate-
country methods,' but only at the cost of accuracy in the application
of the laws. Thus, to resolve the implementation problem, Congress
must simply decide whether it is willing to sacrifice accuracy in return
for applicability.
The solution to the policy problem, however, is not as subjective.
In theory, application of the countervailing duty laws would duplicate
the countervailing duty laws to nonmarket economy countries, tacitly accepting the
House proposal. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1987, H.R. 3, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). The differences between these bills are laid out in STAFF OF
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., H.R. 3, OMNIBUS
TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS LEGISLATION: COMPARISON OF THE HOUSE AND
SENATE PROVISIONS 101 (Comm. Print 1987). Congress did not include § 157 in the
final version of the Trade Bill. See H. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. H1863, H2042 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1988) (conference
report on H.R. 3, supra).
12 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (defining the policy and imple-
mentation problems).
13 See 1987 Trade Bill, supra note 16, § 157.
134 H. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 138 (1987). Notably, the House failed
to provide any guidance as to how the administering authority was to overcome these
"difficulties."
"I See Letter from James A. Baker, Secretary of the Treasury, C. William Ver-
ity, Secretary of Commerce, William Brock, Secretary of Labor, Clayton Yeutter, U.S.
Trade Representative, and James Miller, Director, Office of Management and Budget,
to The Honorable Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, House Committee on Ways and
Means 13-15 (Oct. 30, 1987) (on file at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
While the Administration shared the general concern over the implementation problem,
see id. at 15, it expressed specific concern that many of the various provisions relating
to nonmarket economy countries would violate GATT commitments and expose United
States producers to retaliatory measures. See id. at 13.
13' See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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the protection already available through the antidumping law. This du-
plicative protection, combined with the fact that the countervailing duty
laws would be enforced against most nonmarket economy countries
without requiring any showing of injury, would result in excessive pro-
tection of United States producers and the impairment of important po-
litical and trade relations.
A. The Implementation Problem
The implementation problem inherent in applying countervailing
duty laws to nonmarket economy countries is the difficulty in accu-
rately identifying and quantifying subsidies in the absence of market-
based prices, costs, and exchange rates. The operation of a nonmarket
economy is radically different from even the most government-driven
market economy. 13 7 In a free-market economy, prices and resource-allo-
cation are determined by the natural forces of supply, demand, and
scarcity of commodities. 38 In the absence of government intervention,
these forces interact to allocate resources efficiently to their most valua-
ble uses. Thus, a firm operating in a free-market economy purchases
inputs and sells its output at market-determined prices. 3
The fundamental distinction between market and nonmarket econ-
omies is that in the latter, the market is supplanted by state-controlled
central planning. In a nonmarket economy, profits, prices, and resource
allocation are controlled by the state and do not reflect the forces of
supply, demand, or allocative efficiency. 140 The price of a commodity is
137 Cf Soltysinski, Price Competition, supra note 10, at 6 ("[T]he frequency and
scope of state intervention in the market is incomparably wider in the centrally planned
economy countries [than in market economies]."). Some scholars question the logic of
line-drawing between market and nonmarket economies. See Alford, supra note 10, at
98-127. Professor Tarullo goes even further, rejecting the market ideal embodied in
United States trade laws as an impossible standard. See Tarullo, supra note 1, at 557-
60. Despite the fact that the United States has a mixed economy with both private and
public economic control, and centrally-planned economies are experimenting with west-
ern economics, the two remain very different. Compare P. SAMUELSON, supra note 1,
at 37-49 (describing the price functioning of our own "mixed economy") with id. at
819-24 (describing the Soviet, Chinese, and Eastern European economies).
138 See Steel from Czechoslovakia, supra note 114, at 19,371; P. SAMUELSON,
supra note 1, at 39-41.
139 See Steel from Czechoslovakia,'supra note 114, at 19,371; P. SAMUELSON,
supra note 1, at 39-41.
140 See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 2; P. SAMUELSON,
supra note 1, at 821-23; Downey & Graham, The Regulation of Dumpingfrom State-
Controlled Economies: Where Next? in INTERFACE Two: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
ON THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF EAST-WEST TRADE 435, 438-39 (D. Wallace & D.
Flores eds. 1982) [hereinafter INTERFACE Two]; see also Note, supra note 1, at 416
("Production costs and sale prices reflect an entirely different set of factors than these
figures would represent in a market economy.").
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but one of the policy tools used by the government to promote its social,
political, and economic objectives.' 4 ' Prices used to determine profits
need not reflect the actual costs of production, 142 for the goal of
microeconomic efficiency generally does not exist in a nonmarket econ-
omy. 4" Furthermore, in most nonmarket economy countries there is no
reliable exchange rate by which to convert the nonmarket currency into
dollars. 44
These factors operate to create an economy that, "[bly market
standards . . . is riddled with distortions."'1 45 In a nonmarket economy,
the state and the producer are virtually the same.' 46 Consequently, an
alleged act of subsidization is conceptually inseparable from the state's
normal role of allocating resources. 147 These distortions led the Depart-
ment of Commerce 14' and many academics l4' to the conclusion that
identifying and quantifying subsidies in nonmarket economy countries
is a hopeless task.
While it is easy to see that the implementation problem exists, its
magnitude is nonetheless difficult to estimate. The degree of inaccuracy
encountered in applying free-market principles to nonmarket economies
depends largely on the method of application. To apply countervailing
duty laws to nonmarket economy countries, the Department of Com-
merce is likely to substitute price and cost information from a compara-
ble surrogate market economy for the information that does not exist in
the nonmarket economy country. This method finds support in Article
15 of the Subsidies Code, which provides for the use of the surrogate-
country approach to calculate the value of a subsidy when conventional
means are infeasible. 50 Regulations proposed in the past by the De-
141 See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 2; Downey & Gra-
ham, supra note 140, at 438.
142 See Comment, supra note 9, at 222.
143 See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 821-23.
144 See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 2; Downey & Gra-
ham, supra note 140, at 438.
141 Steel from Czechoslovakia, supra note 114, at 19,371-72.
146 Cf P. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 821 (noting that in the Soviet Union,
"[tlhe state owns almost all factors of production.").
147 See Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1315-16 (Fed.
Cir. 1986); Recent Development, International Trade: Imposition of Countervailing
Duty Laws on Products From Nonmarket Countries-Continental Steel Corp. v.
United States, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 745, 749 (1986).
148 See Steel from Czechoslovakia, supra note 114, at 19,373.
140 See, e.g., Barcel6, supra note 1, at 850; Hudec, Interface Revisited: "Unfair
Trade" Policy After the Tokyo Round in INTERFACE Two, supra note 140, at 23;
Soltysinski, Price Competition, supra note 10, at 20.
150 See Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1317; Comment, supra note 14, at 329-30.
Article 15(2) provides that:
It is understood that in [the case of nonmarket economy countries] the
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partment of Commerce also have advocated the use of surrogate-coun-
try procedures.151
A second factor influencing the magnitude of the implementation
problem is the economy of the particular country under investigation.
Just as there exists no pure free-market economy country, there is also
no pure nonmarket economy country. The degree of central economic
planning varies across nonmarket economy countries, 1 2 and the current
economic trend in many of these countries is to move away from strict
state control and toward a free-market system.151 If this movement con-
tinues and results in prices and consolidated exchange rates that more
accurately reflect the forces of supply and demand, the application of
the free-market principles underlying the countervailing duty laws will
be greatly facilitated.154 Moreover, movement toward a free-market
economy would increase the accuracy with which surrogate-country
procedures could be applied.
Thus, contrary to the conclusion reached by the Department of
Commerce, the implementation problem does not render the application
of countervailing duty laws to nonmarket economy countries a hopeless
effort. Congress bridged the gap between free-market and nonmarket
economies in 1974 when it applied the antidumping law to nonmarket
economy countries through the use of surrogate-country and con-
calculation of the margin of dumping or of the amount of the estimated
subsidy can be made by comparison of the export price with:
(a) the price at which a like product of a country other than the importing
signatory ... is sold, or
(b) the constructed value [] of a like product in a country other than
the importing signatory ...
Subsidies Code, supra note 89, art. 15(2), 31 U.S.T. at 538, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, at 21,
GATT BISD, 26th Supp., at 74.
W61 See, e.g., Proposed 19 C.F.R. § 155.4(a)(3), 44 Fed. Reg. 57,047 (1979) (val-
uing subsidized loans or guarantees by comparison to rates paid without government
benefit by enterprises in a non-state-controlled economy at a comparable stage of eco-
nomic development). These regulations were never adopted.
152 Yugoslavia, for example, is a communist country but is not universally recog-
nized as a nonmarket economy country. See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra
note 1, at 1. Yugoslavia's unique status is due to the country's movement away from
state control and toward a free-market system. Cf. What's News-World-Wide, Wall
St. J., March 25, 1988, at 1, col. 3 ("Yugoslavia's ruling body called for a 'radical'
reduction of state interference in the economy.").
153 See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 819-21, 823-24; S. Soltysinski, U.S. Im-
port Relief Laws, supra note 10, at 23; see also Berliner, Organizational Restructur-
ing of the Soviet Economy in 1 JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
GORBACHEV'S ECONOMIC PLANS 70 (Comm. Print 1987) (discussing current plans to
develop and invigorate the private sector in the Soviet economy); Schiffman & Leung,
China Cautiously Widens Experiments in Market Prices, Wall St. J., April 19, 1988,
at 31, col. 3 (discussing the shift toward free-market pricing in the People's Republic of
China); What's News-World Wide, supra note 152, at 1, col. 3.
154 See Soltysinski, U.S. Import Relief Laws, supra note 10, at 23.
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structed value pricing methods. That same gap can be bridged today in
the context of countervailing duties.
The true nature of the implementation problem is not that some
insurmountable barrier prevents the equation of disparate economies,
but rather that any such equation is inherently inaccurate. Thus, Con-
gress must decide whether it will accept the degree of inaccuracy that
would accompany application of the countervailing duty laws to
nonmarket economy countries. Contrary to the conclusion of the courts
and many scholars, there is no definitive solution.
B. The Policy Problem
The policy problem poses the question of whether the application
of countervailing duty laws to nonmarket economy countries is consis-
tent with United States trade policy. Like the implementation problem,
the policy problem finds its roots in the differences between free-market
and nonmarket economy countries. This Comment argues that because
the economic impact of dumping and subsidization is indistinguishable
in nonmarket economy countries, 155 it would be irrational for the
United States to apply both countervailing duty and antidumping laws
to these countries.
One way of viewing the distinction between dumping and subsidi-
zation is to ask whether a decrease in the price of a good is absorbed by
the firm or by the government."5 6 For example, if a Japanese producer
sells its television sets in the United States at one dollar below the cost
of production, and finances the loss by raising the product's price in
Japan, it is engaged in dumping. 157 But if the same producer sold its
televisions at one dollar below cost and financed the loss with a govern-
ment grant, the product would be subsidized by the government.
In a nonmarket economy, the government and the producer are, in
"I See J. PATrISON, supra note 3, § 18.05, at 18-9 ("The closed nature of and
strict unitary control implicit in centrally controlled economies means that scenarios
may arise in which it is not possible to realistically determine whether the injury aris-
ing from an import from those economies comes from dumping or subsidies."); Diehl-
man, The EEC Anti-DumpinglAnti-Subsidy Policy: New Approaches to Old
Problems? in INTERFACE Two, supra note 140, at 489, 502 (noting that the EEC law
is based on the proposition that "the distinction between dumping and subsidization is
useless with regard to imports from SCE countries").
15 Cf Note, supra note 14, at 597 n.3 (providing examples of dumping and
subsidization).
"' The firm is dum'ping simply because of the price discrimination between the
two markets. The fact that it is selling its televisions in the United States at less than
the cost of production is not necessary to a finding of dumping. By definition, a pro-
ducer is dumping when it charges a lower price for its product in a foreign market than
it does in its domestic market. See supra note 4.
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theory, a single economic entity1 5-much like a parent corporation and
its subsidiary. This unified economic identity clouds the distinction be-
tween subsidization and dumping.15 9  Consider, for example, a
nonmarket economy producer of television sets. If the producer lowers
the price of its exports to one dollar below cost, where is the loss ab-
sorbed? If the producer absorbs the loss through a domestic price in-
crease, the action will be labeled dumping. Alternatively, if the state
reimburses the producer for the loss, the action will be labeled subsidi-
zation. These labels, however, are easily reversed. For example, when
the producer absorbs the loss through a domestic price increase, the
action can also be considered subsidization, because in a nonmarket
economy the state controls the price structure. Likewise, the state may
finance a grant to the producer by mandating an increase in the prod-
uct's domestic price. Thus, as one commentator noted, "[I]n [nonmarket
economies] it can be argued strongly that 'subsidies' enable dumping to
occur, and thus it could be argued that dumping and subsidies are but
two sides of the same coin."' 0 Consequently, in the context of imports
from nonmarket economy countries, attempts to categorize an unfair
trading practice as either dumping or subsidization are meaningless. In
a nonmarket economy, the two are indistinguishable.
Many commentators have noted this point.161 However, those
commentators who focus on the implementation problem have failed to
realize that absent any way of distinguishing between subsidization and
dumping in nonmarket economies, the application of both antidumping
and countervailing duty laws is irrational. The imposition of both laws
would undercut the economic goal of the unfair trade laws: maximizing
market efficiency by offsetting unfair trade practices.
16 2
The application of both antidumping and countervailing duty laws
would afford domestic petitioners a choice of remedies for a single of-
fense. The result of such a choice would be the substitution of counter-
vailing duty petitions for antidumping petitions against nonmarket
18 See Note, supra note 1, at 410, 416-17.
159 By definition, an act of subsidization entails a transfer of some benefit from the
state to a producer. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
160 Denton, supra note 74, at 236.
161 See, e.g., Rawson, An Outline of United States Regulation of Trade With
Nonmarket Economy Countries, in INTERFACE TWo, supra note 140, at 538 (noting
that use of surrogate-country procedures in an antidumping case would, in effect,
"transform a countervailing duty case into an antidumping case"); Comment, supra
note 14, at 332 ("Adoption of the surrogate method would mean that antidumping and
CVD [countervailing duty] petitions involving imports from NMEs would be almost
identical."); Note, supra note 1, at 425 ("Subsidization and dumping are similar con-
cepts in the nonmarket setting because there is no private sector of the economy.").
162 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (discussing the market efficiency
goals of United States trade laws).
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economy countries. This shift would occur because only a few
nonmarket economy countries receive the benefit of an injury test under
the United States countervailing duty laws.16 3 Under the antidumping
laws, however, every country receives the benefit of this test.1 ' If peti-
tioners are given a choice between filing under the antidumping laws or
the countervailing duty laws, they will inevitably choose the former.1 65
The result of this choice would be that the injury test accorded by the
antidumping law would become meaningless in trade relations with
nonmarket economy countries. Furthermore, the number of petitions
filed against nonmarket economy countries would increase, owing to the
absence of a burden on the petitioner to demonstrate injury. To the
extent that the countervailing duty laws could be applied to offset trad-
ing practices that are not causing any material injury to the United
States economy, the unfair trade practice laws would become competi-
tive weapons for domestic producers rather than efficiency-maximizing
standards in international trade relations.166
This result would injure the United States' political and trade re-
lations with nonmarket economy countries. According to one Eastern
European commentator, to allow the application of countervailing duty
laws without an injury test would imply that "the primary objective of
[United States] trade laws is to eliminate or drastically reduce trade." 6 7
By erecting such a barrier to imports from nonmarket economy coun-
tries, United States producers would begin using the countervailing
duty laws as a competitive weapon, and might eventually eliminate a
"I See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 29. Hungary, Poland,
People's Republic of China, and Romania are eligible for an injury test only on duty-
free imports. Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic,
and the Soviet Union are entirely ineligible for an injury test. See id. Ineligibility for an
injury test acts as an incentive to sign the Subsidies Code or a like agreement, see supra
text accompanying notes 90-93, but the structure of nonmarket economies precludes
these countries from signing the Code, rendering the ineligibility for an injury test an
inescapable sanction. See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 30.
164 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
165 See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 30-31; Note, supra
note 14, at 627-28.
166 Cf Barcel6, supra note 1, at 844-47 (discussing the importance of the injury
test to the goal of free-trade efficiency).
167 S. Soltysinski, U.S. Import Relief Laws, supra note 10, at 17. Western com-
mentators have arrived at similar conclusions. See, e.g., GAO REPORT TO THE CON-
GRESS, supra note 1, at 31 (describing the trade inhibiting effects that would result
from the application of countervailing duty laws without the requirement of an injury
test); Comment, U.S. Trade Laws Hinder the Development of U.S.-P.R.C. Trade, 22
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135 (1983) (proposing the abandonment of countervailing
duty law in favor of an injury-based approach); Note, supra note 1, at 424 (noting
possible injury to trade by applying countervailing duty laws to nonmarket economy
countries without an injury test).
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majority of successful nonmarket economy exporters."' 8 Furthermore,
by impairing the ability of nonmarket economy countries to export to
the United States, application of the countervailing duty laws to these
countries would likely lead to retaliatory measures, thus harming do-
mestic producers as well.169
The implications of straining trade relations with nonmarket econ-
omy countries should not be understated. Such a policy clearly runs
against the declared goal of promoting free-trade efficiency between na-
tions.1"' Moreover, the United States would be closing off a significant
market-one that is only beginning to open to Western trade. 17 The
United States historically has enjoyed a favorable balance of trade with
nonmarket economy countries,' 72 and significant political benefits and
leverage attach to these relations.1 3
Current law provides domestic producers a single offsetting duty to
protect them from both dumping and subsidization by nonmarket econ-
omy countries. This scheme achieves all of the protective goals of the
unfair trade laws, but avoids the excessive protection that application of
both laws would engender.
Current law is also consonant with Article 15 of the Subsidies
Code.17 4 Article 15 addresses the application of countervailing duty and
antidumping laws to nonmarket economy countries, requiring signato-
ries to choose between applying either antidumping laws or counter-
vailing duty laws against nonmarket economy countries.175 In essence,
168 See Soltysinski, Price Competition, supra note 10, at 22 n.69.
169 See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 8-9.
170 Cf id. at 5 (defining U.S. objectives as "open and nondiscriminatory trade
with all countries .... ).
"I In 1981, the rionmarket economy countries constituted approximately one third
of the world's population, with a combined gross national product roughly equal to that
of the United States. See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 8; see also
Heiss, U.S.-Soviet Trade Trends in 2 JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., supra note 153, at
455 ("From 1983 to 1985, the Soviet Union ranked in the top five (in 1984 it was 2nd)
U.S. trade partners in terms of the surplus in the trade balance."); Farnsworth, C.I.A.
is Cautious on China's Growth, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1988, at D8, col. 4 (noting
China's development into "one of the world's leading exporters," as well as its growing
demand for food imports).
17I See GAO REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 3. But see Farnsworth,
supra note 171, at D8, col. 6 (noting China's current trade surplus with the U.S.).
173 See GAO REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 8-9.
17' See Subsidies Code, supra note 89, art. 15, 31 U.S.T. at 538, T.I.A.S. No.
9619 at 21, GATT BISD, 26th Supp., at 74-75; J. PATTISON, supra note 3, § 18.05,
at 18-19 (noting that the Subsidies Code recognizes the absence of any distinction be-
tween dumping and subsidies in nonmarket economy countries.).
... See Subsidies Code, supra note 89, art. 15(1), 31 U.S.T. 513, 538, T.I.A.S.
No. 9619, at 21; Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1317 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (describing how Article 15 of the Subsidies Code provides a choice between
countervailing duty law and antidumping law); see also Alford, supra note 10, at 111-
1988]
1674 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
this provision limits domestic producers in signatory countries to a sin-
gle entitlement to relief from the unified unfair trade practice of subsi-
dization and dumping by nonmarket economy countries."7 6
CONCLUSION
As recent congressional efforts to invalidate the Georgetown Steel
decision.77 demonstrate, there is significant support in Congress for
proposals to reject the current scheme and apply both the antidumping
and countervailing duty laws to countries with nonmarket economies. 78
In doing so, Congress would be rejecting the arguments put forth in
Georgetown Steel and by many scholars that the problem of implement-
ing these laws is too severe. Implicitly, Congress would be deciding that
the benefit to domestic producers from applying these laws outweighs
the inefficiencies resulting from the use of surrogate-country and con-
structed value methods to identify and quantify subsidies. This result
would not be illogical; indeed, it would be consistent with Congress's
decision to adopt these methods in implementing the antidumping law
against nonmarket economy countries.
Congress's treatment of the policy problem, however, is not as con-
vincing. It is not at all clear that Congress has considered the political
and economic ramifications of applying the countervailing duty laws to
nonmarket economy countries. The potential results-interference with
the free-trade efficiency goals of United States trade law, and the
12 (discussing the nonmarket economy country choice provision of Article 15).
While Congress never specifically incorporated the requirements of Article 15 into
domestic law, the United States laws are not inconsistent with Article 15. Legislative
recognition of Article 15 would have entailed an act declaring that either the antidump-
ing laws or the countervailing duty laws were to be applicable to nonmarket economy
countries. Ostensibly, this would have been done in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
in which the other restrictions of the Subsidies Code were enacted. Congress noted that
it intended in this Act to make all of the necessary changes in United States law to
implement the results of the Tokyo Round. See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
1, reprinted in 1-979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 381. Congress's silence as to the
application of countervailing duty laws to nonmarket economy countries-in contrast to
the many amendments and regulations regarding the application of antidumping laws
to these countries-was taken as a signal that it had chosen the antidumping laws as
the mechanism for combatting unfairly priced imports from those countries. See Ge-
orgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1316-18; see also S. Soltysinski, U.S. Import Relief Laws,
supra note 10, at 16-17 (discussing judicial declaration of nonapplicability of counter-
vailing duty law to imports from nonmarket economy countries). The Georgetown Steel
holding reinforced this interpretation. See Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d at 1318 ("Con-
gress elected to deal with the problem under the antidumping law and not under the
countervailing duty law.").
17 See Soltysinski, Price Competition, supra note 10, at 21.
17 See supra notes 130-31 (listing efforts to invalidate Georgetown Steel).
178 See H.R. REP. No. 40, Part 1, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 138-39 (1987).
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straining of important political and trade relations-call for a more se-
rious consideration of this problem.

